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I acknowledge not to be well trained in Ny?ya-Vai?e?ika and even less in Buddhist philosophy but in the future passages just try to dilate the noesis of the great Indian philosophers. The current exposition tries to put forth the basic differences in the epistemology of Ny?ya and Buddhism in a succinct and articulate manner. The ambit of this exposition will be throttled to the above mentioned schools of thought; however equivalence will be done, parallels will be explored and texts and contexts will be canvassed wherever relevant. Also, the whole debate which lasted for centuries and perhaps millennia will be on the table but special attention will be given to Jayanta’s Ny?yamañjar?.Ny?ya (literally “recursion”, used in the sense of “syllogism, inference”) is the name given to one of the six orthodox (?stika) schools of Hindu philosophy—specifically the school of logic. The Ny?ya School of philosophical speculation is based on text known as the Ny?ya Sutras, which were written by Ak?ap?da Gautama around 2nd century CE. The most important contribution made by the Ny?ya School to modern Hindu thought is its methodology. This methodology is based on a system of logic that, subsequently, has been adopted by the majority of the other Indian schools, orthodox or not. This is comparable to how Western science and philosophy can be said to be largely based on Aristotelian logic.Jayanta Bha??a (9th Century CE) was a Kashmiri poet and philosopher of Ny?ya school of Indian philosophy. In his philosophical treatise Ny?yamañjar? and drama ?gam?dambara, Jayanta mentioned about the king ?ankaravarman (883 – 902 CE) as his contemporary. At a tender age he composed a commentary to Panini’s A???dhy?y? and earned the name Nava-VÅttik?ra (new commentator). It seems that Jayanta wrote three treatises on Ny?ya philosophy, of which only two are extant, his magnum opus, the Ny?yamañjar? (A Cluster of Flowers of the Ny?ya tree) and the Ny?yakalik? (A Bud of the Ny?ya tree). His third work, Pallava (probably Ny?yapallava, A Twig of the Ny?ya tree) though quoted in Sy?dv?daratn?kara is not yet found.Jayanta mentioned in his Ny?yamañjar?, that he wrote this treatise, like many other masterpieces of world literature, during his confinement in a forest or jail by the king.1 This1 Rajñ? tu gahvare ‘asminna?abdake bandhane vinito ‘aha‚|Grantharacanavinod?diha hi may? v?sar? gamit??| NM Part 1. P. 363.treatise is unique in the sense that this is an independent work, not a commentary of an earlier work, which was the common practice of the day. Secondly according to Jayanta, purpose of Ny?ya is to protect the authority of the Vedas, whereas earlier Ny?ya scholars considered Ny?ya as an scientific study for providing the true knowledge about the real nature of the objects of cognition.Now, according to the Ny?ya School, there are exactly four sources of knowledge (pram?ªas): perception, inference, comparison, and testimony. Knowledge obtained through each of these can, of course, still be either valid or invalid. As a result, Ny?ya scholars again went to great pains to identify, in each case, what it took to make knowledge valid, in the process creating a number of explanatory schemes. In this sense, Ny?ya is probably the closest Indian equivalent to contemporary analytic philosophy.PerceptionPratyak?a (perception) occupies the foremost position in the Ny?ya epistemology. Perception is defined by Ak?ap?da Gautama in his Ny?ya Sutra (I, i.4) as a ‘non-erroneous cognition which is produced by the propinquity of sense-organs with the objects, which is not associated with a name and well-defined’. Perception can be of two types, Laukika (ordinary) and Alaukika (extra-ordinary).Ordinary perceptionOrdinary (Laukika or S?dharaªa) perception is of six types – visual-by eyes, olfactory-by nose, auditory-by ears, tactile-by skin, gustatory-by tongue and mental-by mind.Extra-ordinary perceptionExtra-ordinary (Alaukika or As?dharaªa) perception is of three types, viz., S?m?nyalak?aªa (perceiving generality from a particular object), Jñ?nalaksaªa (when one sense organ can also perceive qualities not attributable to it, as when seeing a chili, one knows that it would be bitter or hot), and Yogaja (when certain human beings, from the power of Yoga, can perceive past, present and future and have supernatural abilities, either complete or some).Determinate and indeterminate perceptionThe Naiy?yika maintains two modes or stages in perception. The first is called Nirvikalpa (indeterminate), when one just perceives an object without being able to know its features, and the second Savikalpa (determinate), when one is able to clearly know an object. All Laukika and Alaukika pratyak?as are Savikalpa, but it is necessarily preceded by an earlier stage when it is indeterminate. V?tsy?yana says that if an object is perceivedwith its name we have determinate perception but if it is perceived without a name, we have indeterminate perception. Jayanta Bha??a says that indeterminate perception apprehends substance, qualities and actions and universals as separate and indistinct something and also it does not have any association with name, while determinate perception apprehends all these together with a name. There is yet another stage called Pratyabhijñ?, when one is able to re-recognise something on the basis of memory.InferenceAnum?na (inference) is one of the most important contributions of the Nyaya. It can be of two types: inference for oneself (Sv?rth?num?na, where one does not need any formal procedure, and at the most the last three of their 5 steps), and inference for others (Par?th?num?na, which requires a systematic methodology of 5 steps). Inference can also be classified into 3 types: P?rvavat (inferring an unperceived effect from a perceived cause), ?e?avat (inferring an unperceived cause from a perceived effect) and S?m?nyatodri??a (when inference is not based on causation but on uniformity of co-existence). A detailed analysis of error is also given, explaining when Anum?na could be false.Theory of inferenceThe methodology of inference involves a combination of induction and deduction by moving from particular to particular via generality. It has five steps, as in the example shown:? There is fire on the hill (called Pratijñ?, required to be proved)? Because there is smoke there (called Hetu, reason)? Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, e.g. in a kitchen (called Ud?h?rana, example of vy?pti)? The hill has smoke that is pervaded by fire (called Upanaya, reaffirmation or application)? Therefore there is fire on the hill (called Nigamana, conclusion)ComparisonUpam?na, which can be roughly translated as comparison is the knowledge of the relationship between a word and the object denoted by the word. It is produced by the knowledge of resemblance or similarity, given some pre-description of the new object beforehand.Verbal testimony?abda or verbal testimony is defined as the statement of a trustworthy person (?ptav?kya), and consists in understanding its meaning. It can be of two types, Vaidika (Vedic), which are the words of the four sacred Vedas, and are described as the Word of God, having been composed by God, and Laukika, or words and writings of trustworthy human beings. While Vaidika testimony is perfect because the Vedas are spoken by god, Laukika testimony are is not infallible.Conflict over the theory of Pram?ªasFor the Buddhist, the external objective reality is in the form of isolated, discrete point-instants called moments (k?aªas) which are unique particulars (sva-lak?aªas). They are grasped by a flash of momentary sensation called indeterminate perception (nirvikalpaka-pratyak?a) which alone is regarded as pure perception by that school. The world of appearance is merely a construction of our intellect, and consists of generalized images (s?m?nya-lak?aªas) which are negative in the sense that they are merely mental and objectively unreal. These generalized images are comprehended by our intellect, all operations of which are covered under inference used in a general sense. There being two kinds of objects, the pram?ªas are also only two, each having its separate and distinctive sphere. Further, the Buddhist holds that the point-instant, grasped by indeterminate perception, lends vividness to the mental image of determinate perception, and also enables us indirectly to reach the reality. Inasmuch as a determinate perception comprehends only a generalized form which is unreal, and never grasps the point-instant which is real, and further it presents the generalized unreal as a real particular, it is not a genuine perception, but only a pseudo perception. Since a determinate perception grasps the generalized form, it may be regarded as inference in a broader sense.The Ny?ya-Vai?e?ika is opposed to this view. Uddyotakara says: ?We do not accept that there are only two pram?ªas, or that there are only two kinds of objects, nor do we accept the view that there is no intermixture of pram?ªas.2 And with equal emphasis the Ny?ya-Vai?e?ika opposes the view that determinate perception is not a true perception. Objects comprehended by determinate perception are, according to the Ny?ya-Vai?e?ika, complex objects in a way. For instance, substance are composed of parts (from which they are different), and they possess qualities, movements and universal residing in them by inherent relation, and different from them in essence. A substance possessing these2 Na t?vat pram?ªa-dvaya‚ pratipady?mahe, na vi?aya-dvaya‚, napy asa‚kara‚. NV p.13 line 5.attributes is comprehended by determinate perception which, according to the Ny?ya-Vai?e?ika, is as real and valid as indeterminate perception. All the elements grasped by the determinate perception have real objective existence; there is no mental factor involved in it. A determinate perception is preceded by an indeterminate perception in which all the elements of the determinate perception, the substance and its attributes, are grasped, but they are, at that stage, unrelated; they do not stand in the relation of substantive and attribute (vi?e?ya-vi?e?aªa-bh?va). It is pointed out that a related or qualified is possible only when the qualification or attribute is previously comprehended. That is why it is held that an indeterminate perception in which both the substantive and indeterminate perceptions are comprehended, but as they are unrelated, there is no conscious knowledge. No conscious knowledge is possible unless it is in the form of a judgement, i.e., presented in the relation of substantive attribute.3 In determinate perception, we have the cognition of a particular object as related to its universal. When however, the object is not present before us and we have its knowledge only through inference or through testimony, we know the object only ?in its general aspect’, and not as a particular object. Also it is only against the background of this controversy with the Buddhist that one can appreciate the spirited remark of Jayanta, viz., ?The very life of followers of the Ny?ya consists in the theory of determinate perception.?4 This brings home to us how the theory of the universal is intrinsically associated with the theory of determinate perception, and how the theory of perception, constitutes a basic difference in the ontology and epistemology of the two schools, the Buddhist and the Ny?ya.There are some other points of difference in regard to the nature of pram?ªas. According to the Buddhists, each of the two pram?ªas, perception and inference, has its exclusive and distinctive sphere. A unique particular can only be grasped by perception, and never by inference; and vice versa, a universal (which is merely a mental entity) can be grasped only by intellect (inference) and never by perception. This restriction of each of the two pram?ªas to its own to its own sphere is technically called pram?ªa-vyavasth?. This is opposed to the Ny?ya theory of pram?ªa-sa‚plava or pram?ªa-sa‚kara which means that the same object can be comprehended by perception, inference or any other means of knowledge. Uddyotakara, V?caspati Mi?ra and Jayanta argue this point against the Buddhists. The Buddhist contention is that it is futile to comprehend by another pram?ªa the same object which has already been comprehended by the other. Ny?ya answers that an object is comprehended by different-different pram?ªas in different-different ways. So, it would, however, appear that this controversy in the field of epistemology between the two3 NSM verse 484 Naiyayik?n?‚ ca savikalpa-pratyak?amay?? pr?ª??. NM part 1 page 81schools is due to their metaphysical differences. To the Buddhist, the external reality is of an undivided unitary nature. It has not many aspects which may be comprehended by different pram?ªas. The Buddhist asks:?When once the nature of a unitary object has been directly perceived, what other aspect of it remains which is to be perceived by other means of knowledge (pram?ªas)?5Another point of difference is that, according to the Buddhist, mean of knowledge is always in the form of knowledge, and there is no difference between a pram?ªa and its resultant (pram?ªa-phala) called pram? (knowledge); they are identical. Ny?ya, on the other hand, at least from Jayanta, maintains the difference between the two-one being the means, and other the resultant knowledge. Thus, the means of perception is pratyak?a-pram?ªa, while the resultant knowledge is pratyakªa-pram?. Similarly, the means of inference is different from the resultant inferential knowledge. The former is designated as anum?na, the suffix ana (lyu?: to denote instrumental nature) denoting instrumentality, and latter as anumiti, the suffix ti (ktin: to denote abstractness) denoting the resultant state. It may be noted that in the case of inference, there are two words, anum?na and anumiti, the former in the sense of inference and the latter in the sense of knowledge obtained from that. But in the case of perception, the same word pratyak?a, signifies both, means of knowledge and resultant knowledge, the difference being indicated by adding to it the word pram?ªa and pram?. The pram?ªa, being different from pram?, it was held by Jayanta and the later writers that pram?ªa might be in the form of knowledge or non-knowledge.6 Thus, according to later manuals of the Ny?ya-Vai?e?ika School, when an indeterminate perception is take as the resultant knowledge, the sense is held to be pram?ªa, the sense-object-contact being regarded as operation (vy?p?ra), i.e., the in intermediary process between an instrument and its result. Similarly, when a determinate perception is taken as a resultant, the sense-object contact is regarded as the means, and the indeterminate perception as the intermediary operation. In both these cases, the means, i.e. the sense or the sense-object contact is in the form of non-knowledge. But when volition to accept or to reject to be indifferent to it (h?nopad?nopek??buddhi) is the resultant knowledge, the means is in the form of indeterminate perception, the determinate perception being the intermediary5 Ekasyartha-svabh?vasya pratyak?asya sata? svayam,Ko ‘nyo na dÅ??o bh?ga? sy?d ya? pram?nai? parik?yate.A Buddhist verse quoted by Jayanta in NM Part 1st p.87.6 Bodh?bodha-svabh?va s?magr? pram?ªam. NM part 1 page 12 line 7.operation.7 Here the pram?ªa is in the form of knowledge. The Buddhist repudiates this view completely. Dharmak?rti says that only knowledge is pram?ªa, and not non-knowledge like sense-object contact.8 This point has been well dealt by Jayanta9 and V?caspati Mi?ra.10There is yet another juncture of dispute between the two schools. According to Ny?ya, the sense-object contact is a necessary condition of perception. In the case of the senses of smell, taste and touch, their objects naturally come in contact with the senses. In visual perception where an object is necessarily distant, it is held that our eye in the form of visual ray moves to the direction of object and seizes it at the place where it is. Similarly, a distant sound produces a series of sounds, the preceding sound dying after producing the next one. The sound which is heard by the ear is the one which has been produced in the cavity of ear itself. It is, thus, held that the senses illumine or cognize their objects only by reaching or contacting them. So far as the Buddhists are concerned, the sense and its object are only two simultaneous moments; and anything like the one reaching the other, or the visual sense moving to its object, is quite inconceivable.Fourthly, the two schools differ each other regarding the nature of volition in respect of an object which has been perceived. According to Ny?ya, the volition is expressed in one of the three forms: (a) acceptance of the perceived object, (b) rejection of it, or (c) indifference to it. The Buddhists, on the other hand, accepts only the first two forms, including the third in the second. Jayanta took pains to prove that the attitude of indifference to an object is different from the first two, because in it there is neither liking nor disliking for the object.11 It appears rather strange that there is so much controversy in a relatively minor matter. The reason is obvious; it has a bearing on the metaphysics of the two schools. For the Buddhist, the existence of an object consists in its producing some efficient result. An object which has been perceived must produce some efficient result on the perceiver who would either accept or reject it. Indifference means no efficient result which is tantamount to the non-existence of the object. But according to Ny?ya, the existence does not consist in producing an efficient result, but it is constituted by the universal (satt?-j?ti). Indifference is, therefore, a third kind of volition, different from acceptance and rejection.Again the Buddhist insists that the relation between the external reality and the thought image is a case of the ?non-comprehension of the difference’ (bhedagraha), and not that of the imposition of identity between the two (abheda-graha). V?caspati Mi?ra in his Ny?yav?rtikat?tparya??k? (page 682 line 28) refutes the Buddhists’ claims. And if the7 Tarka-bh??? p. 338 PV 1.3 page 3.9 NM part 1, pp. 1210 NVT, Page. 1611 NM page 22 line 33.identity between the two be accepted, it will mean comprehension of the unique particular in a perceptual judgement which is impossible; hence the Buddhist insists on holding it to be case of non-comprehension of the difference between the two, and not a case of comprehension of identity between the two. Some of the later writers have failed to note this subtle difference between the two views. For instance, ?r?dhara, while expounding the Buddhist theory, has examined both the alternatives as if both of them could be acceptable to Buddhists. But Jayanta who is earlier than ?r?dhara, has noticed the subtle difference. He says: when a knower has a thought-image, ?he is deceived on the account of the thought-image immediately following a sensation, and erroneously thinks that in his thought-image has grasped the object of sensation; this they call the identification of the two.12 Identification is caused, because the difference between the object grasped by the sense and that by the thought is not comprehended; it is not caused by (positive) comprehension of identity of the two which are different.?13Last, but not the least that the Buddhists state that if testimonial-knowledge is considered to be corresponding with the outer object then there must be a tad?tmya or tadutpatti relation between knowledge and its object. Whereas, in between the two, neither of them is possible. These two (object and knowledge) are different, so there is no iota of possibility of tad?tmya relation. Tadutpatti is also not possible as anvaya-vyatireka relation is not present between the two because the object and knowledge can be existent without one another. So, by testimony, we can only know the vivak?? of the subject, and this vivak?? can be a result of ignorance also.14 15 ??ntarak?ita was earlier visamv?di, so he regarded testimony as invalid means of knowledge, but later while considering the relation between the object and knowledge, he accepted testimony to be included in inference. Now, we see that there are ample of logical arguments Ny?ya has given to refute the Buddhists claims but here two major ones are mentioned. First of all, the vy?pti-relation which is between linga and ling? cannot be confused with the one between object and knowledge. V?tsy?yana says that the relation between object and its knowledge is denoted by relative case, but it is totally different from the one between the vy?pti-relation between linga and and ling?. Another answer is given by Jayanta; from smoke etc. hetu-s vahnivi?e?yaka12 Ekikaraªa, s?rupya and s?lak?anya are all synonyms.13 Dar?an?ntarya-vipralabdhas tu dÅ?yam eva gÅhitam manyate tad-abhim?nena ca pravartate idam tad-ekikaraªam ?hu? dÅ?ya-vikalpayorbhedo yanna gÅhyate, na punar bhinnayor abhed?dhyavas?ya ekikaraªami?yate. NM. Part 1 Page 281 line 2314 Vaktrvyaparavisayo yo ‘rtho buddhau prakasate|Pramanyam tatra sabdasya narthatattvanibandhanam| PV 1.415 Nantarikritabhavacchabdanam vastubhih saha|Narthasiddhistatastehi vaktrabhiprayasucakah|| PV 3.2.14parvatavi?e?yaka pratipattirupa inferential knowledge is gained, but firstly vi?e?ana’s and afterwards vi?e?ya’s avagati happens in object related pratipatti, which is obtained by the pada.16Bibliography1. 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Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of London15. Madhavacarya, Sarvadarsanasamgraha Ed. Abhyankara, Poona 192416. Mishra, Keshava; Tarkabhasa, Poona 193717. Murti, TRV, Centra Philosophy of Buddhism, London, 195518. Nyayabindu, with the Nyayabindutika of Dharmottaracarya, Ed. Peterson, Bibliotheca Indica Series, Calcutta, 192919. Radhakrishnan, S. Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 200620. Radhakrishnan, S. Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 200616 NM part 1 page 14021. Randle: Indian Logic in the Early Schools, Oxford 193022. Russell, Bertrand, Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 195823. Sharma, C. A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 199724. Shastri, D.N., The philosophy of Nyaya-Vaisesika and its conflict with the Buddhist Dignaga school: Critique of Indian realism, Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, New Delhi April 197625. Sinha, JN: Indian Phycology-Perception London 193426. Sridhara, Nyayakandali with Prashastapadabhasya, Banaras, 189527. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic Two Volumes, Leningrad 193028. Syadvadratnakara, Ed Acarya Mahaprajna Jain Vishva Bharati, Nagaur, 199729. Vishvanath Nyayapancanan, Nyayasiddhantamuktavali, Royal Asiatic Society, Calcutta 190930. Winternitz, M; History of Indian literature, Vol.2 (Calcutta University, 1927).Thank You

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