Long before philosopher, Edmund Gettier came along, knowledge was thought to be equal to justified true belief, which is to say that: “You know p iff, i) p is true, ii) you believe that p, iii) and you are justified in believing that p” (Gettier, 1963)However, Gettier argued that ‘p’ cannot simply be known because you are justified in believing that ‘p’. He proposed several counter-examples to the Justified True Belief theory (JTB theory) and they are known as Gettier cases. In this paper, I aim to explain how a Gettier-style case spells trouble for the view that knowledge is justified true belief. Gettier’s main objective wasn’t to solve the mishaps behind the JTB theory, however other philosophers took it upon themselves to use Gettier’s examples and create newer cases similar to his. Take into example Alvin Goldman’s ‘fake barn country’ case (Lycan, n.d.): A man is driving down a countryside filled with barns. He stops his car to rest right in front of a barn and he thinks that he is seeing a barn (which is what he is doing). What he is unaware of, however, is that whenever a barn burns down, the locals put up barn facades to keep the tourism alive. The barn the man stops his car in front of happens to be one of the last real barns in the area. In this case, the fact that the man stopped his car in front of a barn and thinks to himself that it is in fact a barn is justified true belief, but, is it intuitively right to say that it is knowledge?Two main features of Gettier cases lie in the fallibility of every justification as well as the concept of chance. Each of his cases rely on the premises not necessarily having to be true, but by chance it being true. To exemplify, in the case of the ‘fake barn country’, it was by sheer chance that the man was standing in front of one of the very last standing barns which then made his belief a JTB. Gettier’s main point of argument was based on the factor of sufficiency when it came to the JTB theory. He was skeptical on the fact that a mere justification of a belief was adequate to identify knowledge as this would mean that a truth can be implied by a falsehood producing a false belief. In an attempt to steer clear of any possible truths being implied by falsehoods, a philosopher named Robert Nozick suggested his own theory. Nozick does not completely abandon neither the Gettier cases nor the JTB theory, rather, he advances them so that no false beliefs are being produced by ensuring that the conditions are both necessary and sufficient to be an instance of knowledge (Nozick, 1981, p 174). He adapts the first two conditions of the JTB theory, yet, he formulates two of his own conditions and completely dismisses the third original condition: “You know p iff, i) p is true, ii) you believe that p, iii *) if p were not true, you would not believe that p, iv *) if p were true, you would believe that p” (Nozick, 1981, p 174)Nozick refers to condition 3 and 4 as ‘subjunctive conditionals’. Also known as counterfactual conditions, the two conditions are used to indicate that if something were the case, something else would result (Nozick, 1981). If I then apply Nozick’s theory to the previously mentioned Gettier-style case of the barn country, the proposition ‘the man is looking a real barn’ can be further analyzed:The man knows that he is looking at a real barn iff:i) He is in fact looking at a real barn, ii) He is justified in believing that it is a real barn,The first two conditions hold thus far, however, the third condition is when one can start to understand the lack of true knowledge in the Gettier case:iii*) If the man was not looking at a real barn, he would not believe that he was looking at a real barn. But, in this case, the man did not realize that almost all the other barns were fake, therefore, he would not know the difference. The man has no real knowledge of whether he is looking at a real barn.The subjunctive condition 3 already dismisses this case as an example of true knowledge and we need not apply it to condition 4. I believe that Nozick’s theory is generally convincing as it does exactly what it attempts to do. It eliminates the occurrence of false beliefs that are obviously present in Gettier cases. For example, as shown above, one can apply the subjunctive conditionals to “track” the truth of ‘p’ to know ‘p’ (Nozick, 1981). In doing so, he also shows a clearer, more in depth explanation as to why certain cases are not instances of true knowledge.