Philosophy can in no way be standardized. Nevertheless, this essay is a normative critique of the modern philosophy of mind and one of its most prominent issues – the mind-body problem. In fact, this is the core of this branch of philosophy. It questions the link of the body to the mind, their independence and most importantly the external influences on these entities.Philosophers who work in this area aim to figure out the nature of the mind and mental means, and how are the minds affected by the body and vice-versa. Our perceptual judgments depend on stimuli that hit our various sensory organs from the external world. These incentives cause immediate changes in our mental states that create sensations. Someone’s desire for food will force that person to move in a specific direction to obtain what they want. A question occurs, whether it is possible at all for our conscious experiences to take place because of the mind? Which is still an undetermined matter given nothing but electrochemical, intangible characteristics.Before we get into the analysis of multiple mind-body arguments proposed by different theories and philosophers, I want to elaborate the normative approach of this essay. Normative ethics, as opposed to non-normative ethics, try to define a norm, that people, as a rule, have to accept, whether it’s the mind-body problem in philosophy of mind or the Trolley Problem in utilitarianism. In this essay, I am not proposing any norms, on the contrary, I am analyzing whether the mind-body theories fit existing normative ethics. There are two schools of philosophy concerned with the mind-body issues (dualism and monism). Nevertheless, some arguments and theories do not fit one or the other school of thought. René Descartes a substance dualist is the founding father of Dualism. He argues that the mind is an autonomously existing substance, but property dualists claim that the mind is a group of independent criteria that start from the brain but are not limited to the brain. It states that the mind is not a physical substance, a “res cogitans.” Philosophy of mind calls the subjective aspects of mental events “qualia.”Monism is the theory that the mind and body are not ontologically recognizable things. This view first came about in 5th century BC and only in the 17th century was improved by the Dutch Philosopher Baruch Spinoza. Neutral monists such as William James, Ernst Mach argue that events in the world can be seen as either mental or physical depending on the link of their relations. Spinoza is a dual-aspect monist. He is more inclined to think that there is some indeterminate material and that both matter and the mind are attributes of this material. The latter is unknown. The most common monist ideas from the 20th to 21st centuries have been somehow a variation of physicalism.Physicalists contend that a physical theory exists, also, that we will eventually be able to explain all mental processes with the physical method as it moves forward and improves. Physicalists maintain various viewpoints and the ontological status of these features remains unclear. As opposed to physicalists, idealists assert that the external world is either mental or just an illusion, solely created by the mind. So the mind is all that exists. Most modern philosophers of mind approve either the reductive or the non-reductive physicalist position. They argue in many different ways that the mind is not something entirely unrelated to the body. Reductive physicalists on another hand, say that all mental states and properties will eventually be explained by science.Non-reductive physicalists claim that even though the mind is not a separate substance, mental properties prevail over physical properties. Neuroscience has been of great help in the process of clarification of these issues. Nevertheless, they are far from being resolved. Modern philosophers of mind have not yet been able to figure out how naturalistic terms can argue the qualities of mental states and properties. If consciousness can exist independently of physical reality, one must be able to explain how physical memories are created. Dualism must then define the way consciousness affects physical reality. There is one possible explanation proposed by Arnold Geulincx and Nicolas Malebranche, and that is of the existence of a miracle, where all mind-body interactions require the immediate influence of God. Occasionalism is the view by Nicolas Malebranche that asserts that all supposedly causal relations between physical events, or between physical and mental phenomena, are not causal at all. While body and mind are different substances, causes are related to their effects by an act of God’s intervention on each specific occasion. Well, at a point in history where all science depended on the church and church-related benefactors, many philosophers came to this argument.God does not fit into the normative approach of this essay, but zombies do. This argument is based on a thought experiment introduced by Todd Moody and later improved by Chalmers who is the author of “The Conscious Mind.” The idea is that one can imagine one’s body, and therefore come to terms with the existence of one’s body, without any conscious states being associated with this entity. If the zombie knows, it is a zombie, then the reality of zombies is possible. Chalmers’ argues that it seems reasonable that such a being could exist. If physical sciences can describe zombies; then they must be a real thing. None of the concepts discussed in these sciences base their arguments on consciousness or other mental phenomena; any physical entity can be by definition described scientifically via physics. Others, such as Dennett have argued that the notion of a philosophical zombie is an impossible concept. He claimed that one must believe that one is a zombie for the statement to be correct.Dennett argues that “Zombies think they are conscious and have qualia, they think they suffer pains— but they are just ‘wrong’ in ways that neither them nor us could ever discover!” The latter is the view that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, causally interact with physical states. The normative conclusion of this analysis is that many scientific discoveries have disregarded the idea of third parties access to the beliefs and feelings of the philosophical subject. For example, Sigmund Freud argued that a psychologically-trained skilled observer would be able to understand a person’s unconscious motivations better than the person who is observed. That a philosopher of science can know a person’s customs and habits better than the person, who carries these patterns and practices by merely following their actions. He also asserts that modern psychological experiments that cause people to see things that are not there provide substantial grounds for rejecting Descartes’ argument, because scientists can describe a person’s perceptions better than the person can.